The atomic bombs used on Japan to end WW II were not a rational and justified decision

Those who argue for the benefit of the decision to drop the bombs, in general approve that bombings were finished the military months faster than will take place differently, thus saving a lot of lives. It is discussed, that there would have been massive on both sides in the impending Operation Downfall invasion of Japan,( Tsuyoshi Hasegawa 2005) and that even if Operation Downfall was postponed, the status quo of conventional bombings and the Japanese occupations in Asia were causing tremendous loss of life.
The Americans expected to lose a lot of soldier in the planned intrusion of Japan, though actual number of expected misfortunes and wounded is subordinated to some debate. It depends on a constancy and reliability of the Japanese resistance, and whether and the Allies would have invaded only Kyūshū in November 1945 or if a follow up Allied landing near Tokyo, projected for March 1946, would have been needed. Years after the war, Secretary of State James Byrnes claimed that 500,000 "American" lives would have been lost, however by summer 1945, U.S. military schedulers projected 20,000-110,000 battle deaths since initial November 1945 intrusions, with approximately three to four times that number wounded. (The Complete USA killed in operation on all fronts in the Second World war in, almost four years of war were 292,000.)
Political stalemate advanced between the military and civil leaders of Japan, the military increasingly determined to fight despite all costs and odds and the civilian leadership seeking a way to negotiate an end to the war. Further complication of the decision was the fact that any cabinet could not exist without the representative of the Imperial Japanese Army. This meant that the Army could veto any decision by having its Minister resign, thus making it the most powerful post on the SWC. In early August of 1945 the cabinet was equally split between those who advocated an end to the war and those who would not surrender under any circumstances. The hawks consisted of General Korechika Anami, General Yoshijiro Umezu and Admiral Teijiro Toyoda and were led by Anami. The doves consisted of Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Naval Minister Mitsumasa Yonai,and Shigenori Togo and were led by Togo.( The Pacific War Research Society 2005)
The peace fraction, led by Togo grasped on the bombing as the decisive justification of delivery. Kōichi Kido, one of Emperor Hirohito's closest advisers, stated: "We of the peace party were assisted by the atomic bomb in our endeavor to end the war." Hisatsune Sakomizu, the chief Cabinet secretary in 1945, called the bombing "a golden opportunity given by heaven for Japan to end the war." Hisatsune Sakomizu, main secretary of a Study in 1945, named the bombing "a gold opportunity given by heavens for Japan to finish war." The pro-peace civilian leadership was then able to use the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to convince the military that no amount of courage, skill, and fearless combat could help Japan against the power of atomic weapons. The cabinet made a unanimous decision to surrender and accept the terms of the Potsdam agreement.
In 1963 the bombings were a subject of the judicial review in Ryuichi Shimoda et al. v. The State. For 22- nd anniversary of an attack on Pearl Harbor, District court of Tokyo refused to operate on legality of the nuclear weapon in general, but has found, that "the attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused such severe and indiscriminate suffering that they did violate the most basic legal principles governing the conduct of war" (Falk, Richard A.. "The Claimants of Hiroshima"). In the opinion of the court, the act of dropping an atomic bomb on cities was at the time governed by international law found in the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907 and the Hague Draft Rules of Air Warfare of 1922–1923 and was therefore illegal.
Takashi Hiraoka, mayor of Hiroshima, upholding nuclear disarmament, said in a hearing to The Hague International Court of Justice (ICJ): "It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons, which cause indiscriminate mass murder that leaves [effects on] survivors for decades, is a violation of international law". Iccho Ito, mayor of Nagasaki announced in the same hearing:
“It is said that the descendants of the atomic bomb survivors will have to be monitored for several generations to clarify the genetic impact, which means that the descendants will live in anxiety for [decades] to come. [...] with their colossal power and capacity for slaughter and destruction, nuclear weapons make no distinction between combatants and non-combatants or between military installations and civilian communities [...] The use of nuclear weapons [...] therefore is a manifest infraction of international law.”
John Bolton, former US ambassador to the United Nations, used Hiroshima and Nagasaki as examples why the US should not adhere to the International Criminal Court (ICC):
"A fair reading of the treaty (the Rome Statute concerning the ICC), for example, leaves the objective observer unable to answer with confidence whether the United States was guilty of war crimes for its aerial bombing campaigns over Germany and Japan in World War II. Indeed, if anything, a straightforward reading of the language probably indicates that the court would find the United States guilty. A fortiori, these provisions seem to imply that the United States would have been guilty of a war crime for dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This is intolerable and unacceptable."
Although bombings do not meet definition genocide, some believe that this definition is too strict, and that these bombings represent a genocide. For example, University of Chicago historian Bruce Cumings states there is a consensus among historians to Martin Sherwin's statement, that "the Nagasaki bomb was gratuitous at best and genocidal at worst."
Those who proves, that the bombings were unnecessary on the military bases hold that Japan already was in essence defeated also ready to surrender.
One of the most notable individuals with this opinion was then-General Dwight D. Eisenhower. He wrote in his memoir The White House Years:
"In 1945 Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives." (Eisenhower, Dwight D.1963)
Other U.S. military officers who disagreed with the necessity of the bombings include General Douglas MacArthur (the highest-ranking officer in the Pacific Theater), Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (the Chief of Staff to the President), General Carl Spaatz (commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific), and Brigadier General Carter Clarke (the military intelligence officer who prepared intercepted Japanese cables for U.S. officials), and Admiral Ernest King, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Undersecretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard, and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet "The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender." Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman.
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, after interviewing hundreds of Japanese civilian and military leaders after Japan surrendered, reported:
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

The review assumed, that has continued usual bombing attacks on Japan -- with additional direct, and indirect accidents - will be necessary to compel delivery by November or mentioned dates of December.
Many, including General MacArthur, have contended that Japan would have surrendered before the bombings if the U.S. had notified Japan that it would accept a surrender that allowed Emperor Hirohito to keep his position as titular leader of Japan, a condition the U.S. did in fact allow after Japan surrendered. U.S. leadership knew this, through intercepts of encoded Japanese messages, but refused to clarify Washington's willingness to accept this condition. Before the bombings, the position of the Japanese leadership with regards to surrender was divided. Several diplomats favored surrender, while the leaders of the Japanese military voiced a commitment to fighting a "decisive battle" on Kyūshū, hoping that they could negotiate better terms for an armistice afterward. The Japanese government did not decide what terms, beyond preservation of an imperial system, they would have accepted to end the war; as late as August 9, the Supreme War Council was still split, with the hard-liners insisting Japan should demobilize its own forces, no war crimes trials would be conducted, and no occupation of Japan would be allowed. Only the direct intervention of the emperor ended the dispute, and even then a military coup was attempted to prevent the surrender.
Historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's research has led him to conclude that the atomic bombings themselves were not even the principal reason for capitulation. Instead, he contends, it was the swift and devastating Soviet victories in Manchuria that forced the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945.


1. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (2005). Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 298–299.
2. The Pacific War Research Society (2005). Japan's Longest Day. Oxford University Press, 352.
4. Falk, Richard A.. "The Claimants of Hiroshima", The Nation, 1965-02-15. reprinted in (1966) "The Shimoda Case: Challenge and Response", in Richard A. Falk, Saul H. Mendlovitz eds.: The Strategy of World Order. Volume: 1. New York: World Law Fund, pp. 307-13.
5. November 1995 Public Sitting, in the Case of Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflicts at La Hague International Court of Justice
6. Eisenhower, Dwight D. (1963). The White House Years; Mandate For Change: 1953-1956. Doubleday & Company, pp. 312-313.